I emerge from the Cave of Blogging Hiatus to offer what will hopefully be a brief take on recent events in the Middle East and North Africa. For the sake of brevity, I’m going to focus primarily on countries that have kicked the ancien regime to the curb, and will perhaps return to others- Syria, Yemen, Bahrain- at a later time.

Libya
Muammar al-Qadhafi’s capture and summary execution provided one of the most dramatic conclusions to one of North Africa’s most entrenched dictatorships. However, it is by no means the end of the Libyan’s struggle. The country now faces three extremely daunting challenges: disarming and demobilizing the rebel forces, building state institutions and civil society in a country where most of the populace has literally known nothing but Qadhafi and his jamahiriyya philosophy, and promoting national reconciliation. While all of these are problematic, the first and the latter are what worry me the most. The insecurity of Qadhafi’s ammo dumps has been well documented, but what’s even more ominous are the signs of deepening divisions between political and military actors from East and West Libya. While the revolt and political fronts initially began in the eastern areas of Darnah and Benghazi, it was the Western fighters from the Nafusa mountains and the coastal city of Misratah who saw the bloodiest combat, endured the worst sieges, and ultimately did the bulk of the fighting. Regional differences were long present in Qadhafi’s Libya due to the Colonel’s calculating political moves, and it remains to be seen whether or not all of the country will truly adhere to the political transition developed in Benghazi. Overcoming this will probably prove to be the biggest challenge for the country, and will likely influence how the first two challenges play out.

Also, as an aside, it was probably the worst decision of Qadhafi’s life to flee in the direction of a contingent of fighters from Misratah. After what he did to that city every day for more than two months, he probably got off easy.

Egypt
I am equal parts pessimistic and optimistic about Egypt. On one hand, the various revolutionary parties have learned that getting rid of Mubarak was like cutting out a cancerous mole only to discover that the cancer has metastasized throughout the body. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (abbreviated as SCAF from henceforth) has played an incredibly cynical game of instituting policies harsher than Mubarak’s, including detaining bloggers who question its commitment to reform, criminalizing protest, and dragging its feet on reforming the country’s police force as well as creating electoral laws that read like calculus equations in their complexity and trying to structure itself as the supreme arbiter of power within the new constitution. With the first of three rounds of parliamentary elections coming up at the end of November, it really does remain to be seen what political forces will take charge in Egypt, and if so, to what extent SCAF will actually allow them to govern.

Enough with the pessimism. If there’s one thing that makes me optimistic, it’s the indomitable character of the Egyptian people. Getting rid of Mubarak rekindled the stubborn determination of Um al-Dunya (the Mother of the Earth, as Egyptians sometimes refer to themselves), and simply put, there are too many people who refuse to go back to the old system or worse. The Egyptian people were proud of their army for refusing to open fire on protesters (as they were allegedly ordered to do by Mubarak’s interior minister, Habib al-Adly), but the longer SCAF stays in power, the more their reputation loses its luster. While the generals seem to be intractable now, they will eventually lose the consent to govern. I’m hoping that the Egyptians prove me right on this one.

Tunisia
While the media spotlight has since turned elsewhere, Tunisia continues to find its footing after overthrowing Ben Ali in January. Recent elections resulted in En Nahda (an Islamist party) winning a plurality of seats on a commission tasked with writing a new constitution. While pundits tend to freak out at the term Islamist, En Nahda has seemingly bucked that trend by announcing its intent to form a coalition with two of the most prominent liberal parties. I’m hoping that En Nahda models itself after Turkey’s AKP party, which so far has done a decent job of balancing religion with governance. The country faces challenges- rural unemployment, which was one of the major catalysts for the revolution, remains high- but it’s much easier to be optimistic about Tunisia.

So there’s my take on how things are shaping up so far. Regardless of the final outcome, this has been a hell of an inspiring thing to watch.

No blog about the Middle East would be complete without rampant speculation about what Osama Bin Laden’s death means for the region, so here’s my thoughts.

1. In recent years, intelligence figures alleged that OBL had shifted to more of a figurehead role instead of someone who was actively engaged in planning and executing attacks. This is an understatement- Bin Laden’s role in Al-Qaeda had ALWAYS been more of a symbolic figurehead than an actual plotter. So much of Al-Qaeda’s propaganda was built on this myth that Bin Laden was a legendary fighter who mustered an Arab army to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan, when in actuality, his “Arab Afghans” (as they came to be known) fought only a series of limited engagements with only one real tactical success. (The bulk of the fighting- and dying- in Afghanistan was carried out by the predominantly Afghan insurgency.) The October 2000 attack on the USS Cole and the 9/11 plot were planned and organized by other Al-Qaeda operatives, notably Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, with Bin Laden signing off on operations and footing the bill for them. His role in Al-Qaeda was ostensibly its emir (commander/leader) but the actual organization itself was run by mostly Egyptian jihadists, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Saif al-Adel, a former officer in Egypt’s Special Forces. Bin Laden never really had the tactical or strategic competency to plan attacks- he just signed off on them as Al-Qaeda’s leader.

Similarly, Bin Laden’s death does absolutely nothing to change the threat posed by extremists. Groups like Al-Qaeda and its franchises will still continue to attack targets in their host countries and aspire to international attacks with varying degrees of success. If anything, Bin Laden’s death gives them a neat propaganda pretext to justify the next attempted underwear bombing, but if it hadn’t been Bin Laden, it would have been Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank/drone strikes in Pakistan/American support for Ali Abdullah Saleh/it rained on Tuesday. Al-Qaeda has already built up its rationale for attacking America, and Bin Laden’s death is a surprisingly less significant event for the operational, day-to-day life of terror organizations.

2. Bin Laden’s death is a nail in the coffin of Al-Qaeda’s main organization, but it pales in comparison to the dozens of nails and mounds of dirt heaped on by the revolutionaries in Tunisia, Egypt, and even Yemen. Islamic extremism has not played a significant role in any of the popular uprisings of the Arab Spring, which is incredibly damaging to Al-Qaeda’s propaganda. Events in Egypt were no doubt especially stinging to Ayman al-Zawahiri, who for years urged the Egyptian people to rise up and overthrow the Mubarak government. When they finally did so, it was under the banner of democracy and political liberalization- not the austere, extremist Islam so coveted by Zawahiri. Even in Yemen, where Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is strongest, Islamic extremism has not motivated the anti-government movement aimed at forcing out President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

3. Ayman al-Zawahiri will likely take total command over Al-Qaeda, which is sure to be a deeply polarizing event within the international jihadist movement. Fawaz Gerges goes into exquisite detail about why Zawahiri has long been a controversial figure in the jihadist movement in his excellent book, but in a nutshell, Zawahiri ran the Egyptian Islamic Jihad into the ground, bankrupted the organization, and only signed on with Bin Laden because he had cash. Taking jihad international was never really a popular move with jihadists, as they had their designs set on Cairo and Riyadh rather than Washington and New York.

Bin Laden’s death, while cathartic for the American people, really doesn’t change much in the present. We will continue to be at war in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we will continue to carry on a covert campaign in Yemen. Jihadists will continue their attacks. The problems of today will continue to be the problems of tomorrow, but at least we can finally close the book on Osama Bin Laden after nearly ten years, hundreds of billions of dollars, and thousands of lives invested in his end. However, it is my sincere hope that killing Bin Laden will allow us to start thinking about what comes next, which I’m hoping translates into a more judicious, calculating application of US power abroad. This could be our opportunity to move beyond seeing the Islamic world through anything but the myopic lens of terrorism, and the first step towards moving beyond the past ten years. Here’s to hoping that the mood of national elation moves us towards cooler heads and saner judgements.

There are a lot of things that I’ve been wanting to write about, as I’ve gone to several events in the DC area where I’ve listened to and talked to the most amazing minds working towards a new Egypt. I saw Michelle Dunne of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace give a really insightful outline on where Egypt can go from here.  I saw a panel at GWU which consisted of journalists, academics and activists (although I guess you can argue that all of them are activists) get into an intense debate about the role of the military and the Muslim Brotherhood in shaping the constitution and the future of the country. Tomorrow, I’ll be attending a lunch discussion at the Society for International Development for “A Discussion on the Current Situation and the Road to Reform.” One of my friends who I met at a Young Professionals in Foreign Policy event will be there so I’ll have two things to look forward to. I also recently had a job interview where I was asked to submit a writing sample, so I wrote up a short memo on US-Egypt trade relations. Fingers crossed. Needless to say, Egypt hasn’t left my mind.

I guess the big lesson that I’m learning from watching both Egypt and Japan go through their respective recovery/transition periods is that people show admirable abilities to come together and get through tough times. The international community, as always, is full of compassionate supporters and it makes me feel a bit more at ease when I know there are amazing people out there in this overwhelmingly big and sometimes depressing world.

My heart goes out to all of the people in Japan who have been affected in any way by the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear threat. My mom told me that Japanese people are very strong and can endure very difficult situations. After WWII, we had nothing but we became one of the largest economies in the world. We can build our country again and again, no matter what happens. Also, everyone in my family is safe, if you were wondering. Hamdilallah (Arabic for thanks be to God… although on a side note… I’m not very religious, but it’s just a common saying to express relief).

Also, if you want to help out by donating money, Huffington Post made a fairly comprehensive list of places that you can donate to here.

1. No-Fly Zones (NFZ): A cursory consideration of an NFZ makes it sound very appealing, but when you dig a bit deeper, it’s very problematic. For one, I agree with Robert Gates’ assessment that an NFZ would be extremely difficult to enforce. Qadhafi’s loyalist forces do possess an ample amount of surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, and radars sufficient enough to pose threats to any aircraft. Maintaining an NFZ would first require suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions, which would entail bombing runs. In order to effect that, you’d also need search-and-rescue assets to pluck out downed air crews,  AWACs aircraft to coordinate sorties, and other significant investments of equipment and manpower. An NFZ may seem like it’s a relatively resource-light endeavor, but these things have a way of swelling into extremely large commitments that are almost comparable to maintaining a ground offensive. Also, Qadhafi’s jets aren’t nearly as big of a problem as his helicopter gunships, which can take off anywhere and fly low enough to evade radar detection. Robbing Qadhafi of air superiority would definitely be a boon to the rebels, but doing so could be incredibly difficult.

2. Arming the Rebels: Another option that’s been kicked around is arming the rebels. This also seems attractive because it’s cheaper than a NFZ and presents minimal risk to life. However, the rebel movement is not unified under one banner- while it’s obvious that everyone hates Qadhafi, it’s less obvious what their post-Qadhafi conceptions of governance would look like. While I’m not going to beat on the Islamist drum and I’m not trying to imply that Libya equals Afghanistan, the last time we did the “arm the rebels” plan we found ourselves facing the same arms we gave to the Afghan mujahideen 20 years later. Also, guns have a tendency to migrate- weapons shipped to Libya might just as easily find themselves in some other place in the immediate future.

3. Send in the commandos: This kind of scenario is actually the mission that US Special Forces excel in: aiding an indigenous rebel movement fighting an unconventional war against an unfriendly state power. SF’s entire mission is built around some variant of this platform- amazingly enough, the skills needed to raise an insurgency are also very similar to the ones used to combat an insurgency, as they’re doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. US commandos worked well with the Afghan Northern Alliance in 2001, and also with the Kurdish Peshmerga in 2003. However, it’s not a given they’d be able to do the same with the Libyan rebels. As I pointed out above, we still don’t have a good enough idea of who the factions are and what they represent. There’s the “transitional government” led by the former Justice minister, but it’s difficult to gauge what their level of support or control over the movement is. Additionally, introducing ANY US ground forces would be EXTREMELY problematic- while we could rightfully claim we’re intervening on the side of freedom and democracy (for real this time, too) it probably wouldn’t go over well in the Arab and Muslim world at all, especially after our disastrous experiment in Iraq. It’s also kind of telling that Benghazi and Darnah (the two main rebel strongholds in eastern Libya) contributed most of the Libyan contingent to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (see pages 10-13 of what I linked to.)

4. International Politics: Of course, none of this matters unless there’s some sort of international mandate that provides the necessary justifications for intervention. A unanimous UN Security Council vote would be needed to invoke the Chapter Seven protections needed for any kind of military intervention, and it’s unlikely that Russia will agree to this (they’ve had their own bloody reckoning with insurgents). Perhaps a better settlement could be undertaken by the Arab countries, but this is also highly unlikely. While the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League have condemned Qadhafi, it’s unlikely that they’ll be handling this on their own. Egypt, the largest Arab military power, is dealing with its own domestic turmoil, and Saudi Arabia, the next largest power, is unlikely to intervene as they have their own domestic civil unrest as well. NATO will wait until a UN resolution clears them to act, and given Qadhafi’s regaining of the initiative, the time for any kind of action is dwindling.

There are no easy or safe options in Libya. The US cannot act unilaterally for a whole host of practical and philosophical reasons, and the international community will probably continue to drag its feet for some time. The sad calculus of international relations also presents an unfortunate truth: a civil war in Libya poses little threat to international order or the global economy, as it isn’t a major oil power like Saudi Arabia or a strategically important country like Egypt. While Qadhafi is a rotten son of a bitch who deserves the full Ceausceu treatment, it seems increasingly unlikely that it’s going to be at the hands of anyone but the Libyan rebels. And unfortunately, it doesn’t seem like they’ll be able to succeed without some form of outside help.

In short, this is an ugly thing to watch.

Sara came to America to start a new life with her husband but the rest of her family lives in various countries throughout the Middle East. Her brother Mudy remains in Alexandria and has been experiencing first hand what we’ve been reading in the news. Whenever I’ve logged onto facebook in the past 2 weeks, I’ve seen numerous updates from Jake and Sara, who have been practically liveblogging the events and keeping everyone informed. They even went to a demonstration publicized as ‘Yinzers for Egypt’ on a rainy day where they marched through the streets cheering “Here we go Egypt, Here we go!” Here is a picture of Sara with one of the signs from the demonstration taken by Jake (a very talented photographer, check out the link!).

Sara had recently met a journalist for the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review and connected him with her brother. Today, the article came out quoting both Sara and Mudy describing the chaos and the subsequent search for normalcy in Alex.

Here is the article: http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/breaking/s_721700.html

and here is a quote:

As people tire of living on the edge of violence, and more accept the government’s concessions for a slow transition of power, the protesters’ ranks will dwindle, Mahmoud predicted.

“A good government would have done this without people protesting and people dying,” he said.

Happy Monday, everyone!

First, let’s look at what interests the US has in the Mideast:
1. Securing the safety of oil and shipping infrastructure, including the Suez Canal.
2. Maintaining regional cooperation with regards to counterterrorism and deterring violent extremism.
3. On an increasingly more ideological note, maintaining Israel’s security.
4. Promoting democratic governance in a region marked by autocracy.

Over the past 30 years, we’ve relied on Mubarak for the first three at the neglect of the fourth. Given the groundswell of Egyptian desire for democracy, I believe that a thoughtful consideration of our policies will afford the opportunity to secure all four in a just and equitable fashion.

First, the safety of Egypt’s pipelines and ports will remain the #1 priority of any Egyptian government. Considering that nearly half of Egypt’s population subsists on less than $2 USD a day and the way in which this poverty influenced the current civil unrest, any subsequent government’s longevity will depend heavily on preserving Egypt’s status as a shipping and transport hub while also promoting future economic growth for all Egyptians. The US must be prepared to help the Egyptian government do this while also respecting its sovereignty.

Our second, third and fourth considerations are messily intertwined, but no less strategically important than the first. We must recognize that a truly democratic Egypt will have a different stance towards Israel than Mubarak’s desire to preserve the rather tepid regional status quo. Consequently, the US mustn’t be afraid to use $1.5 billion of yearly aid as leverage- the peace treaty with Israel must be maintained. However, a democratic Egypt will likely act to revoke the Gaza blockade. This presents another challenge and opportunity- if Egypt can ease the longstanding suffering of Palestinians in Gaza while simultaneously reigning in Hamas, it will benefit from an international PR standpoint as well as assuaging domestic concerns. The US must recognize the untenability of the existing situation, and place equal pressure on its Israeli and Arab counterparts to do the same in pursuit of sustainable policymaking. Doing this could help Egypt regain its status as an important regional diplomatic player as well as deterring extremism- given that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lies at the heart of our regional security interests, responsible management of the Gaza situation by Egypt with US help could do wonders towards ensuring peace and deterring violent extremism within the Arab world. Similarly, a democratic Egypt may present the necessary political capital to finally get the Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy on a tenable footing.

The recent events in Egypt demonstrate finally that democracy isn’t antithetical to the Arab world, but it also demonstrates that democracy cannot be imposed by an outside party. It’s time that US policymakers embraced the understanding that a democratic Egypt may not adopt Jeffersonian ideals in our image, and yet, that this in and of itself doesn’t pose a material threat to our interests. With proper, equitable and just management of our diplomacy, the cynical confrontation between our values and our interests becomes less imminent.

Is this optimistic? Overwhelmingly so. There are numerous junctures at which either party could make horrendous mistakes, and the consequences of failure remain high. However, Egypt’s unprecedented circumstances present the opportunity to turn the page on thirty years of stagnation, duplicity, and mistrust- I only hope that policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic are willing to consider it as such.

As soon as the internet came back on yesterday, friends and former students came online to announce that they were unhurt, but scared. People put up pictures of torched police vehicles in Alexandria, the looted mall and black smoke billowing over the skyline. Some of our colleagues and friends have chosen to be evacuated, and others have chosen to stay in solidarity with the Egyptian people, or in hopes that things can improve in the foreseeable future. A couple of my old students told me that they were hopeless, everything was horrible and they had the terrifying but necessary duty to defend their homes from looters.

When we were teaching in Alex, there was an unspoken rule that there were three things that we shouldn’t bring up in class discussions: politics, religion and sex. I definitely steered clear of the last topic, as that would have been more awkward than a blind date with a racist, but I tried to get my students to engage in debates and discussions on political issues, partly for them to be able to speak their minds, and mostly for me to get a better understanding of their thoughts and ideas (it also didn’t hurt that debates made classes seem more exciting and much shorter).

One of the reasons why politics is so taboo is because of the oppressive political system that has been in place that made Egyptians fearful of speaking out against the Mubarak regime. Egypt is a country that spreads a lot of things by word of mouth and if word got out that there was an anti-Mubarak insurrection brewing in level 9, the secret police wouldn’t hesitate to make your life a living hell. Here is a quote from a journalist recently interviewed on NPR about political activism and the secret police in Egypt:

“”In Egypt, the secret police are ubiquitous, and they make a point of not being all that secret. Several of my interviews with Muslim Brothers this summer were shadowed by the secret police who came and sat at the next table and ostentatiously made a point of letting us know that they were watching us. … In functioning Egyptian society, you come across stories constantly of people beaten and harassed by the police for everything from political activism, to being gay, to smoking marijuana, to being from the wrong class in the eyes of a policeman, and they have untrammeled authority. Part of their daily goal has been to remind the people that the police have complete power over their lives and are ready and willing to use any brutality necessary to keep order.” – Thanassis Cambanis – a contributor to the NYT, Foreign Affairs and other major publications.

Despite these restrictions on free speech, my students would find ways to express their grievances with the government. It could be something as subtle as whispering “Mubarak” when the word “corruption” was introduced in the textbook. Some students would express how they think Egypt had better days and has a lot of potential to be great. I had one brave student, a former national athlete, give a presentation on the things he hated about Egyptian politics and politicians and why he wanted to see huge political changes so Egypt could be as great as she was meant to be. Towards the end of the term, one student, when asked about his hopes and dreams, bluntly stated: “I hope Mubarak dies.”

When we started the student newspaper, a lot of the students were excited to work with others on a project, see their photographs and articles published and get some writing experience for free. A lot of the articles were about improving your life, being happy, overcoming challenges. We would sometimes joke that it was going to turn into Chicken Soup for the Egyptian Soul. Luckily, there were other articles on Egyptology, literary figures and even a few imaginative short stories.

One extremely bright young female student submitted an article on a current event that she felt very passionate about. She believed in it so strongly that she had gone to public demonstrations and wrote a passionate article that she was so proud to submit for publication. The topic was a touchy one, and often considered a taboo topic in the classroom. She wrote about Khaled Said.

(Khaled Said was a young Alexandrian boy who was beaten to death by plain clothed police officers presumably because he had posted youtube videos exposing police corruption, and officially because he was in possession of illegal narcotics. This resulted in demonstrations of citizens outraged over the wanton abuse of power by police officers.)

As this was a big issue at the time, and the school didn’t want to offend anyone by bringing up a sensitive issue, or jeopardize the safety of the writer or editors, we were unable to publish the article. I apologized profusely and told her that Kenny and I really admired her for writing the article. I told her that I hoped that she would understand and that I would hold onto the article in hopes that I could publish it elsewhere. She was quick to understand and was even thankful for my paltry concession. This was the Egypt that we were living in, and whether we liked it or not, we all accepted it.

I’m sad that it wasn’t until now that I thought of posting her article here, but it seems more relevant than ever. I’ll end this post with her article:

The Deadly Why.

Saying why can cause your death? These days, yes, cheer up, it is an offer with the Egyptian nationality. Yes, it causes your death, especially in our Egyptian society. They can do what ever they want, and you are not able to say NO. I object. You do not have the right to raise your voice and say a word, and if you have the courage to say anything, I admit it will be your last words in life.

“Help me, I am dying” were the last words of the Alexandrian boy after saying why to the detectives who were responsible for his death. No one ran to rescue him from the cruelty of these detectives, and if anyone had done so, he\she would have the same destiny.

What did he do to die with this cruelty? What was his crime? I am directing my question to the minister of interior, what was the crime of Khaled Saied, the 28th man to be killed in that way? What did he do to write his death certificate that early? What did he do to be stolen from his family and friends? To let his mother cry every single moment while remembering the cruel way her son died?

Now, I am not talking about the case of Khaled Saied, I am talking about the case of today, and everyday. Why isn’t there any justice while treating us? How could safety be raped in the country of safety? How could liberty be raped in the country of liberty? Why couldn’t we fulfill justice and equality in everything? Why do we suffer in our beloved country? If you have an answer to all these questions, please tell me.

As I said, my case now is not Khaled, but the thousands or millions that may be Khaled after that. How they die if they say why? Is asking why a crime? Who knows, it may be a crime but they did not mention it in law books or in our constitution. God mentioned in the holy book that Egypt is the country of safety, but what is happening now shows the opposite.

Who is mistaken from your own point of view, the people, or the presidential system? I will talk about my own point of view. The people are hopeless; they are satisfied with everything even it is less than the average. We have many people under the poverty line, but we did not hear their voices for decades, they did not demonstrate against our system. Why didn’t they do so? The answer is so simple, because they are satisfied, they thank God for everything they have. But when the system starts to take their children away to be tortured, humiliated and killed, it is the moment when you can hear their voices full of anger and hatred. They will protest, demonstrate, and refuse the mastery of the system. Those people were ready to do anything for the sake of their children, but now, they lost everything, dignity, respect, and above all their children. Therefore, they have nothing to fear for; the system cannot get this point.

The current system forgot that those people which are we, you and me, are the reason for their domination, and without us, they are nothing. We are capable of everything; they forgot that we fought occupation many times. From ancient Egypt until the modern, we are the people who sacrificed, hold guns and are shooters, we are the people who crossed the canal and defeated the Israeli army.

As you can see, those people cannot accept humiliation from anyone. So, do not drive them to upset you (system), and I think you(system)need to read our history or your history again, and think about the origin of Egyptians -the pharaohs-. Then decide what will you do with us, the pharaohs?

Note from the writer: Sorry if I crossed the limit of respect, even though, I didn’t say everything because I don’t want any problems for you.

1. Mubarak’s “new government” is very, very telling for a number of reasons. The pick of Omar Suleiman as VP is significant because Mubarak never once picked a VP in his 30-year reign. Picking a VP could be an indication of Mubarak eventually stepping down while allowing the NDP to retain its power. Suleiman is also the head of Egypt’s intelligence service and a military man, fluent in English and generally regarded as highly intelligent. He was also the architect of Egypt’s brutal crackdown on domestic jihadists during the 1990s, and a critical liaison for the United States’ “extraordinary rendition” program- the highly controversial means through which captives apprehended by the CIA were shipped to Egypt for interrogation (read: torture). Suleiman’s pick serves two purposes: first and foremost, it ensures Egypt’s military will enjoy the best seat at the table, as Suleiman will surely be extraordinarily receptive to their interests. Secondly, Suleiman has proven himself to Mubarak’s backers, namely the US and Israel, as someone who won’t rock the boat vis-a-vis the longstanding but unpopular peace with Israel and a reliable partner in US counterterrorism efforts. In the big picture, these may seem like myopic appeals for support, but a large part of American and Israeli foreign policy is based around those two tenets.
2. Much like the regime it wants to bring down, the opposition is making its own case to the military and the international community as to why it’s a better bet than the other guys. Yesterday, Mohamed El-Baredai gave a speech in Cairo’s Tahrir Square calling for the protesters to maintain momentum, and the whole of the opposition, including the Muslim Brotherhood, threw their support behind him. El-Baredai, although controversial amongst Egyptian activists for spending years at a time abroad, presents an excellent figure for the opposition: a liberal, highly educated, cosmopolitan Nobel laureate with years of experience in international diplomacy. The Brotherhood’s support of El-Baredai is also a strategic move- it’s meant to demonstrate to Egypt’s army (who have had an uneasy and at times violent relationship with Islamists within its ranks as well as within Egyptian society at large) and the international community that an Islamist takeover of Egypt is unlikely to occur. The opposition’s support of El-Baredai likely is a calculated move that wasn’t developed in a vacuum.
3. The army’s allegiance still remains the single most critical factor in determining Egypt’s future. Earlier today, the army announced that it wouldn’t crack down on protesters during the Feb. 1 “Million Man Marches” in Cairo and Alexandria, citing their legitimate (or “lawful”, depending on whose translation you go by) demands. While it’s encouraging that the army has no intention of replicating Tiannamen Square in Tahrir Square, the critical test will occur if marchers decide to attack the Interior Ministry or the Presidential Palace in Heliopolis. The army no doubt understands that Mubarak is a liability not only to the military’s status but to the nation as a whole. His days are numbered, whether his ouster comes at his own choosing or by the opposition. The military is most likely waiting to see who has the high ground after tomorrow before it acts decisively on behalf of either side.
3. The US continues to find itself in a bad position, although the State Department’s rhetoric has shifted. On Friday, DoS made calls for restraint by both sides- the classic non-response which equals “we haven’t figured out where this is going, so please ask us later.” Now, DoS is calling for a “peaceful transition.” This essentially means that State is preparing for Mubarak’s unscheduled ouster in a matter of days, or for his willing departure from office within the next 10 months. Regardless, it demonstrates that State also recognizes Mubarak’s regime is entering its endgame- the language used is meant to be an equivocal message to the opposition as well as the existing government offering tacit support to whoever wins in exchange for regional stability.
4. One way or another, the end is in sight. It is unlikely that the military will allow a prolonged period of civil conflict to persist, as Egypt has already suffered huge economic losses and an immense loss in stature since this began. I believe that the Egyptians are not irrational zealots who would sacrifice the nation to save the state, and we are fast approaching the point in which a decision must be made.

I have much more to say on these subjects, but for the sake of brevity, I’ll close things off here. Expect more commentary at the end of the day tomorrow. In the meantime- yalla Masr!

The events of the past week have prompted me to break my now inexcusably long absence from blogging. In case you haven’t been following the extraordinary news out of Egypt, massive demonstrations nationwide which started on Jan. 25 reached a tipping point yesterday, prompting the deployment of the army into several Egyptian cities. At least 50 people have been confirmed killed (that number is quickly escalating), several hundred more injured, and most likely thousands arrested. After several days of conspicuous absence on the matter, Hosni Mubarak addressed the Egyptian people at around 2350Z, delivering a Kafka-esque speech in which the basic gist was, “O Egyptian people! I have heard your request for me to step down, and in response, I have fired everyone but myself!” Obviously, this didn’t go over well with the Egyptian people, as the protests have only gained momentum. The army is now on the streets of Cairo, Suez, and our former home, Alexandria.

To say the least, the situation in Egypt is highly dynamic, unstable, and however this pans out, will have profound effects throughout all of Egyptian society, to say nothing of the region at large. Let’s take a look at things from a variety of different perspectives, starting with the street:

1. The single most important variable at play here is upon whose side the army will intervene. The Egyptian army is a strangely constructed institution- for one, the senior leadership and a large portion of the officer corps is reportedly loyal to Mubarak, because he’s given them any military toy they could ask for. (Usually paid for by our American tax dollars, by the way.) However, as Egypt uses conscription to staff the army, it’s also an institution that almost all Egyptian men have experience serving with. This shared experience could prompt a sympathizing with the protesters. Additionally, people were greeting the Egyptian army throughout the streets- in its nearly sixty year history, the Egyptian army has never opened fire on a crowd of Egyptian protesters. While heretofore the generals have been loyal to Mubarak, it doesn’t take a Patton to know that when the other side has the initiative, it’s time to consider differing tactical alliances. The army will most likely go with whoever looks like they’re going to win.
2. There’s no way Mubarak can come back from this. His absence on the protests was absolutely laughable, and his silence even as the headquarters of his National Democratic Party burned was telling. It demonstrates a dictator out of touch with the plight of his people, and probably being fed faulty information by sycophantic advisers. The political reforms that he PROMISED to adopt this time around are well and good, but they are the demands made by the opposition YEARS ago. These latest demonstrations aren’t about reform- they’re about Mubarak stepping down. His speech, which rivaled many SNL opening monologues in its comedic value, will not do anything to stop the protests, and will likely make them worse. I especially loved the bit about how it was because of all of Egypt’s political freedom that the demonstrations happened.

Now I’d like to look at things from a “what if Mubarak falls” perspective:

1. The most preferable outcome would be Mubarak’s peaceful resignation and transit from Egypt, followed by a temporary government until elections can be held to establish a new Peoples’ Assembly and Presidential office. However, this presents numerous other challenges, namely of questions of leadership. Mubarak staffed the most important posts in government with NDP loyalists in a fashion similar to former Tunisian President Ben Ali and Saddam Hussein. Consequently, the Egyptian bureaucracy is dependent on the NDP in order to function. This leads to questions: Who would be the best interim president? An NDP functionary or technocrat? A general? Would the Egyptian people rise up against the NDP in a similar fashion to the anti-RCD backlash after the Tunisian revolution? Will the Egyptian opposition parties be willing to work with an NDP without Mubarak at the helm? These are fairly speculative questions, but they’re important ones to answer if Egypt ousts Papa Hosni.
2. The salience of the Egyptian opposition is another critical variable. One of the small benefits of being brutally suppressed by a dictator for 30 years is that your role in the opposition doesn’t have to be about what you’re for so much as it’s what you’re against. Egypt’s opposition is unified and defined insofar as they’re all against Mubarak and the NDP, but an actual stated cooperative policy platform is elusive. Will the religious Muslim Brotherhood party be able to get along with the secular parties? How will the opposition react if it now has to govern?
3. The Muslim Brotherhood’s true attitude towards democratization will be tested. Ostensibly, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood of today is not your father’s Muslim Brotherhood. They’ve seemingly embraced democratic ideals, although many speculate if their attitude towards democracy is contingent on their popularity within Egyptian society and a calculated assessment of how important democracy is to achieving their political objectives. There’s also a conflict between the Old Guard of the Brotherhood, who are often viewed as more radical than its newer and younger members. The Egyptian people have overwhelmingly supported the Muslim Brotherhood because of a widespread religious revival, but also because they took advantage of Mubarak’s neglect of the poor to set up social services and establish patronage. If there’s one thing I want to be absolutely clear about: the Muslim Brotherhood isn’t a resoundingly pro-American or pro-Israeli organization at all, but the modern Brotherhood IS NOT the political wing of Al-Qaeda. There’s differences of several orders of magnitude between today’s Egyptian Islamist movement and the transnational jihadists of Al-Qaeda, but that’s best left for another blog.

If Mubarak doesn’t fall, it’s likely that Egypt is in for some extremely dark days. I would expect the opposition parties to be completely decimated by the arrests and “disappearances” for which the Egyptian mubahis (secret police) are infamous. The international community would likely suspend aid to Egypt in that case, decimating the slowly liberalizing economy even further and leading to an increase in poverty, desperation and making an even more violent showdown inevitable.

And from a regional perspective:

1. The United States finds itself yet again between a rock and a hard place in the Middle East, having put our support behind a strongman dictator in order to protect regional interests instead of upholding the democratic aspirations of the people. Whether or not our policy decisions have helped more than hurt in a long-term sense is a debate I’d rather not get into here, but the fact of the matter is we’ve supported Mubarak for 30 years as he cracked down on his people, generally ignoring his actions while making watery calls for democracy. Equally telling was the usage of American-made teargas against demonstrators- while we can’t control how people use the weapons we give them, it’s never good PR to have “Made in the USA” printed on the devices you’re using to suppress the populace. The cheapest and most likely strategy for the US to take would be to provide the next Egyptian government with a similar amount of aid that Mubarak enjoyed to keep the peace with Israel, deter religious extremism, and hold credible elections every now and then. Of course, it’d probably be much better if we re-examined our strategic posture in the Middle East in light of recent developments in Tunisia, Lebanon, and Egypt, but that remains unlikely for political reasons here in the US.
2. Israel’s probably extremely nervous right now. One of the few successes in Mubarak’s otherwise stagnant reign was that Egypt has honored its commitments to peace with Israel, and I’ve often wondered if a truly democratic Egypt would have signed a peace treaty with Israel to begin with. While I don’t anticipate Egypt to start sending tanks across the Suez Canal again regardless of what comes next, I do think that Israel is going to be very cautious in its dealings with any new Egyptian government. Keep in mind that the Egyptian army’s entire battle doctrine is fighting another way with Israel, and they also happen to have one of the best equipped armies in the Middle East next to Israel.

The situation in Egypt is amazing to watch. My time there convinced me of the plight of everyday Egyptians as they struggled in a stagnating system of institutional neglect, corruption, and authoritarianism. If ever there were a people that deserved to be free, it is the Egyptians. The outcome of this event is far from clear, although it certainly seems to be trending in a certain direction. I, for one, stand with the Egyptian people and hope that a new, democratic government representative of the people is formed quickly. Although the coming days and weeks bring some huge challenges, the potential rewards for Egypt are too great to be ignored.

I don’t think I can top Set’s last beautifully written entry, but I can add one thing to the list of “Things We Will/Will Not Miss About Egypt.” I’m personally amazed that she didn’t mention driving/transit. Who would ever miss nearly dying every time you try to cross the street and arguing with cab drivers? Who has an affinity for frantically trying to buckle a non-functional seatbelt as your cab driver weaves in out of crowded street lanes, honking and flashing his brights whilst doing 120km/h and blasting Islamic prayer songs? Who would hold a fond place in their heart for the crowded mashrouas (microbuses), jammed with more people flinging money around than the floor of the NYSE, or have fond memories of watching hundreds of Egyptians literally trying to beat the train to the tracks as it inches out of the station?

Well, me, for one.

Egypt, by and large, is a land of contradictions, cognitive dissonance in the form of a nation state. It’s these contradictions that make one want to off themselves, yet eventually, it’s these contradictions that make you fall in love with the place. Everything that I hated about Egypt is going to be something that I look back upon and laugh about with a twinge of fondness. Everything I loved about the country will be the things I carry with me and never forget.

Set covered our last day in Egypt pretty well. We had a lovely dinner with our friends at Ibn-al Balad (Literally, the Son of the Country) and then hung out with our friends until it was time to go. At 4am, we were picked up by Osama, our driver, and had an uneventful drive to Cairo. Aside from seeing two people get in shouting matches in line to board the plane, our flight home isn’t worth writing about.

However, our arrival back in America was slightly more exciting. After disembarking at JFK, Set and I approached our first Customs checkpoints. After handing in the little Customs declarations cards to the agents working there, Set blazed right through when my agent decided to ask me a few questions. “What were you doing in Egypt?” He asked.

“Studying Arabic and teaching English,” I said.

“Ah, okay. I see.” And with that, he smiled, crossed out my customs declaration, took my passport, and beckoned me to follow him. I ended up in a small area filled with Arab and Pakistani men, none of whom spoke English very well. I would spend the next 2.5 hours waiting in this area as the ICE/Department of Homeland Security guys apparently examined every crinkle, crease and fold of every passport in front of them- of which there were many. Finally, it was my turn to be questioned.

It started off with pretty much the same questions I’d been asked at the first checkpoint. In my incandescent rage at being detained without explanation for the past 2.5 hours, I’d been coming up with all kinds of pithy responses to the questions I thought I’d be asked, but I decided I’d just play it straight forward lest I find myself in a beachfront cell at Camp X-Ray. It took about ten minutes, and pretty much ran the gamut from “Where did you stay/where did you work” to “Did you receive any specialized military training over there.” Aside from the hand-to-hand combat that I’d mastered after working the Young Learner’s Program for three weeks, no.

With that, my passport was finally stamped and I was let out of Diplomatic Limbo America and into Real America. On my way out, I asked the agent what the reason was for my detainment and questioning. He said, “It’s a completely random screening” as he looked past me and at all of the Arab men and Pakistani guys in their shalwar kameezes. Despite what may seem like some pretty blatant profiling, I should temper my exasperation by mentioning that the DHS employees were very professional and polite with everyone they were talking to.

And now, after an all too brief visit with some great friends, I’m back at the airport, waiting to fly back to California. I’m so excited to be back that I think I’m probably going to land about 20 minutes before the plane actually does. Reading back through the entries we’ve written over the past year has been a serious trip, and I’d like to thank you, our dear readers, for your comments and for sticking with us and our ramblings. As Set mentioned, these certainly won’t be our last entries in this blog.

!مسلاما يا أصحابي

(Goodbye, friends!)